11 August 2026 - 19:50
Breaking America's Hegemony; From Caracas to Tehran

A retired Lebanese army brigadier general and author, in an article titled "Breaking America's Hegemony; From Caracas to Tehran," wrote that the Iran war has broken America's hegemony, and despite the assassination of the martyred leader of the Revolution, Iran's political system did not collapse.

AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): Mounir Shehadeh, a retired Lebanese army brigadier general and author, in an article titled "Breaking America's Hegemony; From Caracas to Tehran," wrote that the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by the United States in January 2026 and Washington's direct interference in the country's oil sector created the impression that the world had entered a new phase of direct U.S. domination.

According to Shehadeh, Washington was no longer content with sanctions and economic pressure; it seemed to want to convey the message that it could overthrow a country's leader, control its resources, set the rules of the game, and then move on to another case.

He added that this perception, among the United States and the Zionist regime, reinforced the assumption that Iran might face a similar fate: a massive military strike, targeting senior leaders, paralyzing decision-making centers, and ultimately the collapse of the system from within in a short period.

This Lebanese analyst believes that Iran posed the most difficult test for this theory. According to him, the assassination of "Imam Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei," the martyred leader of the Revolution, in the U.S. and Zionist regime attack in February, did not lead to the collapse of Iran's government. Despite this blow, state institutions, the army, and the IRGC continued their activities, and power was transferred to the new leader.

In Shehadeh's view, this development was the first sign that calculations based on the assumption that eliminating the head of the system would also bring down the system itself were flawed.

He considers the significance of the Iran war for the future of the international system to lie precisely in this issue, and writes that America's problem was not its ability to deliver a military blow, because America's military superiority is undeniable. Washington can destroy facilities, target leaders, disrupt infrastructure, and possesses extensive air and naval capabilities that many countries lack, but military superiority does not necessarily mean the ability to achieve political victory, a point clearly demonstrated in the Iran war.

Hormuz; The Factor That Changed the Calculations

Shehadeh continues in his article, "The strategic goal of the war was not merely to inflict damage on Iran, but also to change the political system and limit the country's capabilities. However, the continuation of Iran's political system, its continued ability to respond, and its transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a strategic pressure lever confronted the United States with a dilemma that was not present in the initial calculations."

He describes the Strait of Hormuz as one of the most important keys to the global economy, and adds, "Instead of being able to quickly resolve the Hormuz issue, Washington found itself in a position of negotiating over how to reopen this maritime passage."

According to this analyst, in recent days, the issue of reopening the Strait of Hormuz remains unresolved, and Iran has announced that its reopening is linked to conditions including the cessation of war, payment of compensation, lifting of sanctions, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region.

Shehadeh further asks, "If a great power can destroy its adversary but cannot force it to accept the desired concession, what should it do?" He answers that this turns military power into a different strategic equation.

From Deterrence to Attrition

According to Shehadeh, U.S. power over the past decades has been based on a simple equation: Washington can initiate war, strike with force, and raise the cost of confrontation to a level the other side cannot bear. But the Iran war has raised a new question: what if the weaker side can make the cost of continuing the war for the powerful side greater than the cost of retreat?

He considers this the beginning of attrition. According to this analyst, the United States cannot assess the war solely based on the number of missiles fired or facilities destroyed; it must also calculate the cost of protecting its bases and forces, ensuring shipping security, protecting allies, managing oil prices, preventing the spread of war, and maintaining its image as a power capable of imposing its will.

He writes that the longer the war continues, the more important the question of "who will wear out whom?" becomes.

Shehadeh believes that perhaps the most important consequence of the war goes beyond military issues; because according to him, the main issue is not whether Iran has won in the traditional and conventional sense, but that Iran has shown that America's military superiority does not automatically mean Washington's ability to impose a political outcome.

He adds, "In past decades, the United States, in addition to aircraft carriers, missiles, and aircraft, has also benefited from the 'awe of American power.'"

According to him, countries have been cautious toward Washington not only because of America's ability to destroy them, but because they believed that if America decided to use military power, it would be able to achieve its objectives.

He believes that if this belief is weakened, an important part of America's power will also be affected.

Europe; The Most Sensitive Link

Shehadeh considers Europe perhaps the most concerned party regarding these developments. He writes that Europeans do not view the Iran war as a distant confrontation, because the closure or disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz could lead to rising energy prices, disruption of supply chains, and increased pressure on the European economy.

In his view, any crisis of this kind could spark a new debate in Europe about the extent of dependence on Washington and the necessity of creating a more independent European strategic capability.

He therefore suggests that the Iran war may transform from a regional crisis in West Asia into a turning point in Europe-U.S. relations.

This analyst further emphasizes that one should not conclude from these developments that the United States has lost its power or become a weak country.

According to him, however, the difference between "power" and "hegemony" is the main point. Shehadeh writes, "Power is the ability to strike; but hegemony is the ability to create the belief in others that they are essentially incapable of resisting that strike."

In his view, the significance of Iran's experience lies precisely at this point; if the war has shown that the United States can inflict heavy damage on Iran, but cannot easily overthrow its political system, eliminate its ability to respond, or impose its conditions on the Strait of Hormuz, then an important shift in the global perception of the balance of power has occurred.

Shehadeh also wrote, "NATO member states have reconsidered their relations with the United States after this war, and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf have also concluded that U.S. bases are not necessarily capable of providing their security, and may even expose them to the consequences of war."

He believes that these countries will also recalculate their relations with the United States as a result of recent developments.

From "America's Fall" to "Breaking Hegemony"

In the concluding section of his article, this author emphasizes that the title of the next phase should not be "America's Fall," but "Breaking America's Hegemony."

According to him, China, Russia, Europe, and countries that previously considered America's will as an insurmountable ceiling will now reconsider their calculations.

He concludes, "When countries come to believe that Washington can strike, but cannot always impose its desired outcome on the opponent, one of the main pillars of American hegemony will undergo change."

Shehadeh concludes by writing that the historical significance of the Iran war lies not in having overthrown America, but in having revealed the limits of American power before the eyes of the world. In his view, the world previously mostly asked, "What does America want?" but has now entered a stage where the more important question is: "What can America really impose?"

He considers this development to be the true meaning of "breaking America's hegemony."

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